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ABSTRACT 
Performance Pay and the Gender Wage Gap: Evidence from 
Spain* 
This paper uses detailed information from a large wage survey in 2006 to 
analyze the gender wage gap in the performance-pay (PP) component of total 
hourly wages and its contribution to the overall gender gap in Spain. Under 
the assumption that PP is determined in a more competitive fashion than the 
other wage components, one would expect, in principle, to find a low gender 
gap in PP. However, this is not what we find. After controlling for observable 
differences in individual and job characteristics as well as for non random 
selection, the adjusted gender gap in PP reaches 26 log points, displaying a 
"glass ceiling" pattern. After examining several alternative theories that could 
rationalize these findings, we conjecture that monopsonistic features, possibly 
related to women’s lower labour mobility due to housework, fit better with our 
results than other theories related to occupational segregation. 
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1.  Introduction 
One of the cornerstones of the standard competitive model of the labour market 
is the well-known equilibrium condition equating wage to marginal revenue product 
(MRP henceforth). Accordingly, the final wage distribution represents the equilibrium 
outcome of demand and supply forces. This straightforward implication of the 
competitive model has proven instrumental in the empirical analysis of how relevant 
phenomena, such as changes in the relative demand and supply of skills, have affected 
within and between-group wage inequality over the last few decades in economies with 
flexible labour markets, like e.g., UK and US (see, eg., Katz and Murphy, 1992). Yet, it is 
also well established that the competitive model can provide a rather misleading 
interpretation of how wages are actually determined in real-life labour markets when 
information is asymmetric or search frictions are present in the allocation of workers to 
jobs. In addition, a common feature of many existing labour market institutions (like 
unions and minimum wages) is that they tend to compress the wage distribution and 
thus reduce pay differences between more productive and less productive workers.1 
        While it is reasonable to acknowledge that the competitive paradigm often lacks 
realism in describing how wages are set, there are some specific forms of wage 
compensation that could be considered as good proxies of the “wage equals MRP” 
condition. In particular, if compensation is paid at least partially as a function of 
performance pay – such as bonuses, comission or piece rates- it seems plausible to assume 
that this wage component becomes closer to worker´s productivity than the remaining 
components (e.g.,the base wage) that do not depend so closely on individual 
performance. Following this intuitive reasoning, Lemieux et al. (2009) have analyzed 
the impact of performance pay (PP hereafter) on wage inequality in the US . Their basic 
hypothesis is that, through a widespread reduction in the cost of gathering and 
processing information, growing incidence of PP may have contributed to the increase 
in inequality, mainly at the top of the wage distribution. Indeed, their finding that PP 
                                                 
1 Empirical evidence, such as Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), Card (1996), DiNardo et al. (1996), Farber 
and Gibbons (1996), and Lemieux (1998) provide ample evidence about the different channels through 
which wages are not equalized to their MRPs.  
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accounts for 25% of male wage inequality between the late 1970s and early 1980s 
provides favourable support for this conjecture. 2 
        In this paper, we contribute to this line of research by making use of a recently 
available dataset on the detailed breakdown of total wage compensation for Spanish 
workers into its different components. We re-examine Lemieux et al. ´s (2009) 
hypothesis, but from a different angle which, to our knowledge, is somewhat novel in 
this literature.3  Specifically,  we analyze whether PP compensation differs by gender 
and the extent to which this component contributes to explaining the overall wage 
gender gap (gender gap hereafter) in Spain.  
       One could think of two alternative hypotheses regarding gender differences in PP. 
On the one hand, under the presumption that it is determined in a more competitive 
fashion than the remaining components of the wage, the gender gap in PP between 
equally skilled men and women could be smaller than in the non PP components. In 
other words, since in theory PP responds mostly to meritocracy, equally performing 
workers should receive the same PP irrespectively of their gender. Moreover, if women 
perceive some forms of (taste and/or statistical) discrimination in non-PP jobs relative 
to men, then they will seek intensively for  PP in order to ameliorate these 
disadvantages. However, against this hypothesis one could claim that, to the extent that 
effort at the marketplace may be negatively affected by housework, PP could also 
provide a clear channel through which women´ s greater involvement in household 
tasks hinders their returns in the labour market and therefore lower their PP relative to 
men ´s. 4 For example, Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2006) find that overtime pay in 
Spain, which can easily make up to 40 percent of men's wages,  account for up to 80 
percent of the aggregate gender gap due to women ´s lower availability to undertake 
long working hours.  
                                                 
2 The existing literature has mainly focused on analyses of the incentive effects on productivity of PP 
arrangements; see, inter alia, Booth (1999), Ewing (1996), Dohmen and Falk (2009) and Lazear (2000), 
among others.  
3 There is  however a growing literature on gender differences in compensation for CEOs and top 
executives which shares element in common with performance pay (see, e.g., Bertrand and Hallock, 
2001, and Bertrand et al., 2009) 
4 See Becker (1985) and a stylized model with this flavour in Appendix 2 (A). 
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On the other hand, even abstracting from the role of distorting labour market 
institutions, the assumptions of free access to PP compensation and/or the absence of 
search frictions in a competitive setup may not be suitable for female workers. First, as 
stressed in the occupational segregation literature, women may select themselves into 
jobs where PP is either absent or scarce (e.g. public sector jobs) because they anticipate 
that these positions are more compatible with their larger household responsibilities. 
Hence, in line with the so-called mommy track hypothesis (see Mincer and Polacheck, 
1977), they may willingly opt for jobs entailing steadier and, possibly, lower pay in 
exchange for less penalties in case of career interruptions. Secondly, employers may be 
more reluctant to place women in fast-track jobs, likely to involve PP, if they expect 
lower female work attachment even if they have the same ability distribution as their 
male colleagues (see Lazear and Rosen, 1990). Thirdly, statistical discrimination in the 
allocation of PP jobs may still prevail if employers invest on workers´ specific training 
and therefore try to minimize quits. Moreover, if women are aware of the existence of 
statistical discrimination in advance, this may discourage them from applying to these 
jobs, leading to self-fulfilling equilibria (see Coate and Loury, 1993, and de la Rica et al., 
2009). Lastly, the presence of some monopsonistic features in PP jobs, due to women´ s 
lower mobility or lack of alternative job offers, should not be discarded even if, contrary 
to the standard human capital explanation, this does not lead to lower productivity (see 
Booth et al., 2003, and Manning, 2003).    
       In view of these considerations, our goal in this paper is to dig deeper into the 
specific role played by PP as a determinant of the overall gender gap in Spain.  Our data 
comes from the recently released 2006 wave of the Spanish Earnings Structure Survey 
which contains detailed micro-data information on the various components of the 
wage, such as the base wage, overtime pay and other wage complements. When 
compared to the longitudinal dataset used by Lemieux et al. (2009) - i.e., the interview 
years 1976-1999 of the PSID- our data suffers from a clear drawback since its cross-
section nature prevents us from controlling for workers´ fixed effects. In exchange, 
however, it has the advantage of providing information about the precise amount of PP 
received by workers, in contrast to PSID which only reports qualitative information on 
whether employees receive PP (but not its amount) as part of their total compensation, 
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at least once during their employment relationships. This implies that our data are less 
noisy than theirs and that we can focus specifically on the PP component rather than on 
jobs that pay PP, as Lemieux et al. (2009) do. 
In the first half of the paper, we address the impact of PP on the observed gender 
gap in total pay, both at the mean and throughout the wage distribution, since PP is 
bound to have substantially different effects at different percentiles. In effect, if PP is 
more concentrated at the higher quantiles, where bonuses and commissions are 
believed to represent a more important fraction of compensation, they may have a 
larger impact on the gender gap and therefore help explain at least partly the so-called 
“glass ceiling” effect at the top of the wage distribution.  The second part focuses 
exclusively on the PP wage component and explores whether there are potential 
selection issues in the fraction of employees receiving PP, and to what extent the pattern 
observed for raw gender gaps changes once observable individual controls and 
selectivity biases are accounted for. Additionally, we present evidence about adjusted 
gender PP gaps within-firms and within-occupations in order to disentangle the role 
played by different theories explaining the existence of sizeable adjusted gaps. 
       The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the dataset 
and provides some basic descriptive statistics regarding the whole sample, the 
distribution and extent of PP, the differences between the characteristics of workers 
receiving and not receiving PP, and the contribution of the gender gap in PP to the 
overall gender gap in raw terms. In Section 3, we test whether the PP wage component 
is set in a more competitive way than the non-PP component. Section 4 deals with 
adjusted gaps in PP jobs. After addressing the issue of nonrandom selection among 
workers participating in PP jobs, we analyze which of the different explanations for 
gender gaps fits better with the evidence. Section 5 allows for different returns on 
observable characteristics by gender in order to identify which specific traits are 
differently rewarded in the market place. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our data source is the third wave of the Spanish Earnings Structure Survey 
(Encuesta de Estructura Salarial or ESS 06 in short).5 The ESS is the outcome of a 
European Project aiming at the design of harmonized earnings databases for several 
European countries. The survey is based on two-stage random samples of workers from 
establishments in the manufacturing, construction and service industries. First, 
establishments are randomly selected from the Social Security General Register of 
Payments records, which are stratified by region and establishment size.  In a second 
stage, samples of workers from each of the selected establishments are also randomly 
drawn.  Overall, sample sizes are much larger than in any other Spanish related surveys 
(see below for details). Besides wage compensation, EES collects individual information 
on workers’ demographics (such as age and educational attainment) and job 
characteristics (including industry, occupation, contract type, type of collective 
bargaining,  establishment’ s export activity, establishment size, and region).  
The main advantages of EES 06 relative to its earlier waves are that: (i) 
establishments with less than 10 employees are included in this survey whereas only 
employees in larger establishments were previously interviewed; (ii) it includes a 
module where employers provide detailed information on the breakdown of the total 
annual wage compensation paid to their workers into fixed and variable components. 
This module allows us to identify PP, since data on annual bonuses and commissions 
related to productivity are specifically reported for each employee. One important 
shortcoming, however, is that, since the latter information is directly provided by 
employers rather than by workers and the structure of EES does not enable us to 
construct a matched employer-employee dataset, information on either workers´ civil 
status, spouses´ characteristics or the number and age of children in the households is 
not available. 
More concretely, besides reporting total monthly gross wages and working 
hours, EES 06 does provide information on both the ordinary (base wage and other 
complements due to shifts, tenure, job risks, etc.) and non-ordinary components of 
                                                 
5 The previous waves correspond to 1995 and 2002. 
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annual gross earnings. Regarding the latter category, the ESS 06 distinguishes between 
two different types of payments: 
• Fixed Annual Non-ordinary Payments. This payment “basically 
corresponds to extraordinary compensations at Christmas and summer 
vacations (in Spanish, known as pagas  por navidad y verano) 6, the standard 
rates for overtime work and participation in firms´ normal profits”. It is 
specifically stated that their amount is known in advance by the 
employee, typically established at the collective bargaining level, and that 
they do not depend on either workers´ or firms´ performance.  
• Variable Annual Non-ordinary Payments. In contrast to the first category, 
these are “payments related to workers´ or firms´ performance whose 
amount is not established a priori since it depends on incentives, returns 
and extraordinary profits”. It lumps together bonuses, compensations and 
piece rates. 
Given this breakdown of total wage compensation, the PP component in the 
sequel will correspond to the Variable Annual Non-ordinary Payments whereas the non-
PP components will be identified as the sum of the ordinary wage and the Fixed Annual 
Non-ordinary Payments.  
2.1. Description of the dataset  
Our sample consists of full-time workers aged 18-65 for whom the interview 
month (october) is an ordinary period regarding their labour status. Table 1 displays the 
weighted descriptive statistics for the male and female samples. They contain a total of 
129,930 males (66.6%) and 65,223 females (33.4%) covering almost 18,000 
establishments.                                                                         
                                                [Table 1 about here] 
 Inspection of workers´ demographic characteristics reveals the following 
stylized facts: (i) women´ s educational attainments are significantly larger than men´ s 
                                                 
6 This implies that the fixed part of the total annual gross wage is distributed into 12 ordinary 
instalments and 2 extraordinary ones.  This tradition dates back to the Francoist industrial relations 
during the dictatorship period.  
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– e.g., the percentage of female workers with a university degree (32%) almost doubles 
men’s (18%) whereas the fraction of women with at most primary education is 10 pp. 
smaller (18% vs. 28%) than men´s , (ii) women are about two years younger than men 
(from interpolation of the mid-points of the different age brackets), (iii) female  job 
tenure is about 1.5 years shorter than males´ tenure, and (iv) the raw gender gap is 
about 21 log points in favour of male workers. As regards firms´ characteristics, on 
average, women work in larger establishments (> 200 employees) than men (a 9 pp. 
higher share), and enjoy a lower coverage by bargaining agreements at the firm level (3 
pp. less).  
Regarding total gross hourly wages, the gender gap in favour of men is about 21 
log points, using differences in mean logged wages, and 23.1%, using the ratio of the 
wage levels.7  Interestingly, the incidence of PP (22.7 %) is almost identical across 
genders which, prima facie, is consistent with our previous conjecture that this kind of 
jobs are attractive to women because, in principle, they should be less subject to 
discriminatory practices. This statement, however, will need to be reconsidered later on, 
once we report further evidence on the distribution of women throughout the PP 
distribution.  
2.2. Characterization of performance pay 
Table 2a compares the sample characteristics of workers receiving PP and not 
receiving PP, distinguishing by gender, as well as of the firms where they work. The 
main finding is that workers receiving PP are more educated than the others (40% of 
women and 27% of men in the PP sample have a university degree against 29% and 
15% in the non-PP sample). Likewise, they are older (about a 10 pp. larger share in the 
31-50 age range), have longer tenure (about 2.5 years longer for women and 5 years for 
men), enjoy a higher rate of permanent contracts and work in larger establishments 
(typically less subject to centralized bargaining levels).  
                                                 
7  Denoting the total annual gross wage by GAW, total hourly wages are defined as w= GAW 
/ORH+OVH), where ORH represents annual ordinary working hours set at the collective 
bargaining agreement (jornada anual pactada) and OVH denotes the overtime working hours 
completed in the month of the interview (october). The latter are annualized using the seasonal 
pattern of aggregate extra hours in the Spanish economy as of 2006.  
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Table 2b, in turn, presents the incidence of PP by industry and occupation. 
Regarding industries, Financial Intermediation (60%) and Education (9%) are the sectors 
where PP is most and least prevalent, respectively.  As for occupations, the results 
confirm that PP incidence is much higher among the high-wage categories: 50% for 
Managers and 30% for Professionals and Technicians.   
Finally, Table 2c reports the share of female workers receiving PP throughout the 
distribution of this component of the wage, which we can compare to the average share 
of women receiving PP in our sample, i.e., about 35% (=14798/ 44249). The sharp 
decline in this proportion as we move upward in the PP distribution - from 41% at the 
bottom to 16% at the top- is seemingly inconsistent with the above-mentioned 
conjecture about more skilled women being more likely to seek jobs entailing PP 
compensation, especially since, as reported above, they have higher educational 
attainments than men. By contrast, such evidence would be consistent with the 
implications of theories based on occupational segregation and/or lower mobility 
which predict a “glass “ceiling “pattern whereby well qualified females are less likely to 
get better paid positions than high qualified males.                                  
                                      
                                                [Tables 2a, b and c about here] 
2.3. The Contribution of Performance Pay to the Overall Gender Gap 
We next analyze how important is PP, the size of the gender gap in this wage 
component and, finally, its contribution to the overall gender gap. As explained in 
Appendix 1, the computation of the respective contributions of the gender gaps in the 
PP and non-PP components to the overall gender gap is greatly facilitated by using a 
measure of the gap expressed in percent (i.e., the ratio between average male and 
female wage minus unity) rather than in log points (differences in average logged 
wages), as is customary in the literature. The first four columns in Table 3a present the 
total hourly wage compensation in PP (expressed in €) across genders and the 
corresponding shares of total wages accounted by the PP component. Further, for 
comparison, the hourly wages of non-PP workers appear in the last two columns. Table 
3b reports similar evidence but this time referred to the two components of the wage 
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compensation received by PP workers, i.e. its variable and non-variable components. 
Lastly, Figure 1 plots the three gender gaps in percentage terms (total hourly wage, w, 
PP/variable component, v, and other/fixed or predetermined components, f) both at 
the mean and throughout the wage distribution for the whole sample of workers in our 
sample.   
As can be observed, workers with PP earn more on average than non-PP workers  
(about 64% and 50% higher wages for men and women, respectively) in line with the 
evidence offered in Table 2a about the higher skills and longer job tenure of the former. 
Using individual information on the PP component of the wage, we can compute its 
unadjusted/raw gender gap. This yields a strikingly large gap of 74% (around 46 log 
points using the conventional measure of the gap based on the geometric mean) in 
favour of men. This gap turns out to be much larger than the raw gap in total hourly 
wages found for the whole sample (24% or 20.6 log-points). However, the share of the 
PP component in the total wage is rather low: 7.2% for women and 9% for men on 
average. Nonetheless, as expected, the PP share increases over the wage distribution, 
reaching 22% (men) and 17% (women) at the 90th percentile (P90th). Taken together, the 
low average PP share and the low incidence of workers with PP in our sample (22.7%) 
imply a rather tiny contribution of the gap in PP to the overall gender gap for the whole 
sample of workers: 1.7 pp. out of 24.0 pp. (about 7%), despite exhibiting a mild increase 
at the upper part of the wage distribution where it reaches 3.8 pp. out of 33 pp. (11.5%) 
at P90th.      
                                                           [Tables 3a and b about here] 
                                                           [Figure 1 about here] 
   The next step is to examine whether PP plays a more relevant role when we consider 
the sample of workers with PP exclusively. Using this restricted sample, Figure 2 
displays the raw gaps, again both at the mean and throughout the distribution, in the 
total hourly wage (w), the non-PP/fixed component (f) together with the estimated 
contribution of the PP component to the overall gap as explained in Appendix 1.8 As 
expected, the contribution of PP to the aggregate hourly wage gap is now higher than in 
                                                 
8 The gap in the PP component (v)  is the one displayed in Figure 1. 
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the whole sample reaching , on average, 5.7 pp. out of 32 pp. (i.e., about 18%) and 11.7 
pp. out of 46.5 pp. (25%) at the top of the distribution.   
           In sum, two main conclusions stem from this preliminary evidence: (I) the gender 
gap in PP is much larger than in total hourly wage compensation, particularly at the top 
of the wage distribution where it can explain about one-fourth of the “glass ceiling” 
pattern observed at the higher percentiles, and (II) PP makes a dent at higher wages in 
line with the previous evidence that workers receiving this type of variable 
compensation have better observable characteristics.  
In principle, several theories would be consistent with the above-mentioned 
results. First, as regards finding (I), it is likely that wages set in collective bargaining at 
the sectoral (provincial-, industry-wide) level and actual wages are similar for non-
college workers in less-skilled/blue-collar occupations, while bargained wages do not 
bind for college workers in high skill/ white collar occupations. There is evidence (see 
Dolado et al., 1997) pointing out that employers in Spain improve high-skill workers´ 
pay above compressed bargained wages through formal and informal agreements 
which are likely to involve variable PP arrangements. Therefore, insofar as unions 
compress the wage distribution and base wages respond more to occupational 
categories and tenure than to individual characteristics, like gender, it is likely that the 
raw non-PP gender gap would be quite smaller than the raw PP gap. This is confirmed 
by the fact that the standard deviation of the (logged) fixed component of total hourly 
wages (0.61 and 0.60 for men and women, respectively) is less than one-half  the 
standard deviation of the (logged) PP component (1.41 and 1.34, respectively). 
As for finding (II), it could be rationalized by either: (i)  women with PP exerting 
less effort than men due to disutility of housework, (ii) women self-selecting away from  
jobs where PP represents a relevantshare of total compensation, or (iii) women 
receiving lower PP than men due to monopsonistic features elements in the PP segment 
of the labour market, possibly related to employers´ beliefs that women enjoy lower 
mobility than equally qualified men.  
Appendix 2 (A andB) presents simple models which illustrates the main gender 
implications of jobs offering PP in competitive (A) and non-competitive (B) frameworks 
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to server as background for the discussion of the main predictions of the above-
mentioned theories discussed throghout the sequel. 
         Disentangling which of the previous theories is more likely to operate in 
explaining the very large gender gap found for PP requires several steps. First, Lemieux 
et al.´s (2009) hypothesis that PP tends to be closer to MRP than non-PP compensation 
ought to be tested in our sample. Next, we also need to examine whether the pattern of 
the PP raw gap discussed above remains similar once it is adjusted for differences in 
individual and job characteristics across genders. In other words, it is only under the 
competitive labor market paradigm and under similar observable characteristics that 
the documented PP gap can be described as being “strikingly large”. The next two 
sections are devoted to address these issues.  
                                                   [Figure 2 about here] 
3. Is PP determined in a competitive fashion? 
Following the above-mentioned motivation, we devote this section to analyze 
whether PP is “more attached to the worker” whereas non-PP compensation is more 
“attached to the job”. Once more, the basic insight is that, if PP depends essentially on 
individuals´ endowed and acquired characteristics, MRP would be more transferable 
across firms and occupations, and hence human capital variables – basically age, 
education and, to a lesser extent, tenure 9 -should have higher market returns than for 
workers not receiving PP. Conversely, returns to job characteristics- such as firm size, 
sector, and tenure on the firm should receive a higher market reward for the latter.  
To analyze this issue, Table 4 reports standard mincerian (logged) hourly wage 
regressions estimated by OLS where the returns (estimated coefficients) to job and 
human capital variables are displayed separately in the first two columns for workers 
with and without PP, respectively. The third  column, in turn, shows the results from a 
pooled regression where interactions of human capital and job characteristics with an 
indicator of receiving PP are added to test for statistically significant differences 
                                                 
9 The lower (in absolute terms) coefficient on the interaction of tenure and the PP indicator  may 
reflect high union power in collective bargaining determining the non-PP components of the wage, 
where tenure is a key element in wage increases. 
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between returns in the two samples. Thus, denoting the hourly wage of worker i in firm 
j as ijW , individual and job characteristics as iX  and jX , respectively, and an indicator 
(1/0) for receiving PP as iD  , the estimated model is: 
                       ijjiiijiiij XDXDXXDW εφφββββ ++++++= 213210ln  
   where we expect 01 >φ and 02 <φ . 
    In line with the results by Lemieux et al. (2009), we find that the returns to 
characteristics attached to the worker are larger for workers with PP than for non-PP 
workers. For example, the returns to university and secondary education are 41% (0.304 
vs. 0.215) and 60% (0.09 vs. 0.06) larger, respectively, than for non-PP workers. 
Likewise, the returns to age, as a proxy for potential experience, and to a lesser extent 
tenure follow the same pattern. By contrast, the returns to firm size and other 
characteristics of the job are significantly smaller for workers with PP, as it is also the 
case for estimated coefficients on industry and occupational dummies, not reported in 
this table for brevity. This evidence suports the view that PP responds more  to worker 
‘s productivity than the rest.  Yet, the fact thatestimated returns on firm´s characteristics 
are, in gereneral,  statistically significant points out that workers tend to be categorized 
by firms into jobs, albeit less so in the sample of workers receiving PP. 
                                             [Table 4 about here] 
4. Adjusted gender gaps in the performance pay component 
Once the pattern of the raw gender gap in PP has been described, we next 
proceed  to compute their adjusted counterparts,  accounting for differences in observed 
individual and job characteristics. However, the fact that slightly less than one-fourth of 
workers in the whole sample receive PP and that they present different personal and job 
characteristics than non-PP workers, make us consider that non random selection of 
workers into the sample of those with PP  may be a relevant issue to address. This is 
particularly important if the selection process into PP is not exactly the same for males 
and females In such a case, ignoring gender differences in selection could lead to biased 
estimates of the adjusted gap for the PP component.  
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4.1. Selectivity issues 
       Table 5 presents the results of estimating a probit model to explain participation in 
PP jobs (PP=1, non-PP=0). This model will be later used to compute the inverse Mill 
ratio in a conventional two-stage Heckman approach to control for selection in the 
estimation of  log hourly wage regressions explaining the PP component. Given the lack 
of information regarding civil status or number and age of children in our sample, we 
use the availability of  wage bargaining at the firm level (Firm Agreement) as the 
identifying variable in the participation equation. The insight for this choice is that 
workers subject to this type of decentralized wage-setting  agreement are more likely to 
receive PP compensation than those whose wages are set at a more centralized 
bargaining level (sectoral/provincial or nationwide) where unions play a larger role. 
Further, the fact that the estimated coefficient on this variable is not statistically 
significant when included in the PP wage regression make us rely upon the validity of 
this exclusion restriction. 
     The first column of  Table 5 presents the estimates of the coefficients in the probit 
using the standard explanatory variables, where a Female indicator (1/0) captures 
gender differences in the probability of receiving PP compensation. As can be observed, 
women have a lower probability of receiving PP than equally able men working in the 
same occupations. The remaining estimates are in line with the evidence presented in 
Table 2: higher educational attainment, longer tenure and being in the 31-50 age 
intervals also raise this probability.  
    Thus, in principle, this evidence goes against the earlier conjecture that, under the 
competitive labour market paradigm, equally productive men and women should not 
exhibit significant differences regarding paticipation in jobs offering PP compensation 
and that, if females anticipate non-competitive features in jobs that do not entail PP, 
they are likely to be more prevalent in those paying PP. To examine whether these 
differences in participation can be related to women´s larger disutility in market work 
due to larger involvement in housework, as in Becker´s hypothesis, or rather to 
occupational segregation and/or lower mobility, as in the “ mommy track” and  
“monopsonistic” hypotheses, the second column in Table 5 reports the estimates 
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obtained from a regression where interaction terms between the different age brackets 
and the Female dummy are added to the model.  Under the first hypothesis, the main 
differences againt women shoud appear for those age groups more prone to bear 
household responsibilities since it is actual involvement in housework that hampers 
performance in market work. Lacking information on civil status and household 
composition, we choose to identify women aged 31-50 as those more prone to be 
heavily involved in child bearing, looking after elderly relatives, etc. Thus, conditioning 
on the remaining observable controls, one should expect lower probability of 
participation for women in this age group. This would correspond to a negative 
coefficient on the corresponding interaction terms between PP and the 31-39 and 40-49 
age-bracket indicators. By contrast, under the second hypothesis, the effect should be 
mainly captured by the female intercept since all women, irrespectively of their age, 
antipate career interruptions due to the above-mentioned reasons.  
        The basic finding is that the coefficients on these interaction terms are negative and 
highly significant, pointing out that, conditioning on all the remaining covariates, 
women in two above-mentioned age brackets have a lower probability of receiving PP 
than younger and older women, respectively. For example, the net coefficient of a 
woman aged 30-39 is -0.134 (=-0.103+0.016-0.047) whereas, for women below 30 or in 
the 50-59 interval, the corresponding net coefficients would be -0.103 and -0.041 (=-
0.103-0.01+0.072), respectively. A chi-squared test rejects the null of equal coefficients 
across the previous age brackets with a p-value of 0.023. Thus, this evidence points out 
the “mommy track”/“monopsonistic” hypotheses are likely to play a joint role in 
explaning gender differences in receiving PP.                                                            
                                             [Table 5 about here]  
4.2. Disentangling occupational segregation from monopsonistic features 
4.2.1 Within- firms and within- occupations regressions  
The next step is to analyze which of the two theories embedded in the second joint 
hypothesis is more likely to explain the PP gender gap:  is it “occupational segregation” 
or “ monopsonistic features” ?. To try to discriminate between these two somewhat 
alternative explanations, we carry out  the following exercise. Using the specification of 
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a mincerian log wage equation for the restricted sample of PP workers with a Female 
intercept and equal returns to individual and job characteristics across genders, we 
compare the estimated coefficient on the Female indicator in a regression (augmented by 
the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the participation equation reported in the second 
column of Table 5) under four different specifications: (i) a pooled regression (P), (ii) 
within- occupations (WO),10 (iii) within-firms (WF), and (iv) within-firms & occupations 
(WFO). 
    The insight for such comparison can be briefly described as follows. Let us denote the 
coefficient on the Female dummy in the four specifications above as Pβ , WOβ , WFβ  and 
WFOβ respectively. Then, under the “occupational segregation “hypothesis we should 
expect WOβ  to be significantly smaller than pβ  (since we are comparing men and 
women in the same occupation and firm) whereas WFβ  should be similar to Pβ . 
Conversely, under the “monopsonistic” hypothesis, the estimate of WFβ  should be quite 
smaller than the estimate of pβ  (since now the comparison is between men and women 
working in the same firm), while WOβ  and  Pβ  would be similar. Finally, if both theories 
play a role, then WFOβ  should be below both WOβ  and WFβ  which, in turn, should be 
smaller than Pβ .  
      Table 6 reports the estimates obtained under the alternative specifications where the 
OLS results (without selection correction) are also included in the first column for 
comparison. The following findings stand out. First, the adjusted average gender gap in 
the OLS pooled specification is about 41 log points against a raw gap of 46 log points. 
Second, once we control for selection bias in such specification, the gap increases 
slightly to 45 log points. The fact that this gap is larger than the OLS gap is explained by 
the highly significant positive sign on the coefficient of Heckman´s lambda which 
reflects strongly positive selection of workers receiving PP.  Since women have higher 
educational attainment than men in our sample, despite having lower tenure, this leads 
to a larger gap when selection is taken into account. Third, again controlling for 
selection biases, the estimate of the gap in the within-firm specification (34 log points) is 
                                                 
10 We use the most disaggregated occupational classification available for our dataset, namely, 18  
occupational categories 
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quite smaller than the corresponding estimate in the within-occupation specification (43 
log-points) which, in turn, is quite close to the gap estimated  in the pooled specification 
(41 log points). Finally, the gap in the joint within-firm and occupation (29 log-points) is 
slightly lower than the gap in the within-firm and within-occupation model. Overall, 
we interpret this evidence as seemingly yielding higher support to the “monopsonistic” 
hypothesis at the joint occupational-firm level than to the conventional “occupational 
segregation” hypothesis in explaining the large PP gender gap.  
                                       [Table 6 about here] 
   Nonetheless, the previous conclusion could be premature if it were to be the case that 
women exert less effort than men in the same occupation and firm because of their 
larger involvement in housework. In such a case, differences in effort could also be 
behind the gap in PP. Lacking a precise measure of productivity, it is difficult to test this 
hypothesis. However, despite the absence of controls on household composition, the 
fact that our sample consist of full-time workers and that we control for age, education 
and tenure – all related to productivity- as well as that the overtime hours are similar 
for men and women, make us believe that gender differences in effort do not play an 
important role in explaining the gap in PP. One possible test of differences in effort can 
be implemented by checking whether the proportion that PP represents over the total 
hourly wage is lower for women than for men, once we control for differences in 
characteristics and sample selection. The insight for such a test is simply that higher 
effort should give rise to a larger proportion of PP. As mentioned above, on average, 
these proportions are 9% for men and 7.2% for women. Though not reported for 
brevity, we have estimated a similar mincerian regression to that shown in  column (5) of 
Table 6, where the dependent variable is the logit transformation of the above-
mentioned proportion.11 We obtain that the Female indicator explains less than one half 
(0.85 pp.) of the 1.8 p.p. gap (=9.0-7.2) gap in the proportions. Therefore, we conclude 
                                                 
11  The logit  transformation, ),,()1/ln( +∞−∞∈− RR  achieves consistency with the support 
of the distribution of the error tem in the regression, where )1,0(∈R is the proportion of  PP 
in the total hourly wage. Denoting by b the estimated coefficient in the regression, then the 
effect of the Female dummy, D , on R becomes ).1(/ RbRDR −=δδ  
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that such a difference is too small to be considered as a very relevant factor in 
explaining the gender gap in PP.  
4.2.2 Quantile regressions    
 Further evidence on this issue can be obtained from comparing the relative pattern of 
the gender gap throughout the distribution on the PP component. Indeed the available 
theories on female segregation in slow-track jobs (aka non-PP jobs in our setup), like 
Lazear and Rosen ´s (1993), predict that gender gaps arise because women face lower 
probability of being assigned to jobs entailing PP jobs even if they are as skilled as men, 
not because they are subject to within-job discrimination. However, given that the 
ability standard for allocation to jobs where PP is paid is higher for women, it should be 
expected that the relatively few women who are at the top of the PP distribution should 
receive higher PP compensation than their male counterparts (see Appendix 2). In other 
words, conditioning on observable characteristics, the gender gap should be negative at 
the top percentiles of the PP distribution. By contrast, theories related to lower female 
mobility, like Booth et al. ´s (2003) “sticky floors” hypothesis, predict that women at all  
percentiles will be paid less than men since there is a higher rent to be earned by firms 
due to women having lower outside opportunities because employers perceive that 
they are less mobile than men.  
      To test which of the two previous implications is supported by the data, we use 
quantile regressions (QR) accounting for selectivity corrections under the within-firm & 
occupation specification. Following Buchinsky´s (1998) approach, the selectivity 
correction for workers receiving PP is based on a two-stage approach. First,  a two-term 
series expansion of the inverse of the Mills ratio in Table 5 is used to obtain an estimate 
of a latent index that approximates the unknown quantile functions of the truncated 
bivariate distribution for the error terms in the wage and participation equations. Then, 
the covariance matrix for the two-stage QR and the selectivity corrected estimates is 
obtained by bootstrapping the design matrix with 100 replications. 
      Table 7 reports the QR estimates of the coefficient on the Female indicator for a few 
relevant percentiles of the PP distribution.  A clear “glass ceiling” pattern emerges with 
the gap evolving from 20 log-points at the bottom deciles to 43 log points at the top of 
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the distribution.  In line with our previous discussion, we interpret this evidence as 
yielding higher support to the existence of monopsonistic features in the determination 
of PP than to female occupational segregation. 
                                              [Table 7 about here] 
5. Decomposing the Gender Gap in PP  
    So far, the estimated models have assumed the same market returns (coefficients) to 
male and female characteristics, except the intercept. Since this assumption is rejected 
by the data (p-value= 0.023), we next report results allowing for different remuneration 
to observed characteristics for workers receiving PP.  
  Table 8 summarises the results of the slightly modified version of the Oaxaca-Blinder 
gender gap decomposition proposed by Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2004) when, as in our  
case, there are indicator variables in the hourly wage regressions which can take more 
than two categories (e.g., education and age). The reported results correspond to the 
WFO specification. In general, we find that the contribution of differences in returns to 
explain the PP gap (46 log-points) is much larger (88%) than the contribution of 
differences in characteristics (12%). Among the former, the largest components are the 
differences in constant terms (26 log points) and in the returns to age. Though we only 
report the aggregate contribution for all age categories, it is worth noticing that the two 
specific categories where differences in returns are larger are the 30-39 and 40-49 age 
groups which jointly account for 5.67 log-points out of the 8.46 log- points contributed 
by age.  This result somewhat points out that typical ages where individuals incur in 
child bearing or other household tasks involves a “marriage premium “ for males and a 
“child/elderly parent penalty” for women,  in line with many studies of the gender gap 
in Spain (see, e.g., de la Rica et al. , 2008).  Interestingly, albeit not large, the differences 
in returns to tenure favour women, in agreement with our previous result that firms 
may find it optimal to offer steeper wage-tenure profiles to women than to men in order 
to retain them (see Appendix 2). Finally, the fact that the female intercept accounts for 
26 log points of the overall gender gap when in the pooled WFO regression it accounted 
for 29 log-points may just reflect that the lack of variables in our dataset capturing civil 
status and household composition may still biasing upwards the size of this coefficient.  
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  All in all, the result in this section do not change our previous conjecture that the 
gender gap in PP and the corresponding “glass ceiling” may be well due to 
monopsonistic features in PP jobs, whereby female lower mobility leads to a rate of 
exploitation by firms even when women acquire higher education than men to signal 
their commitment to job stability.    
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have used a large cross-section dataset for Spanish workers in 2006 to 
examine whether the gender performance-pay (PP) gap differs from the gender gaps in 
other components of wage compensation. We have found evidence that PP responds 
more to workers´ performance and that women receiving PP have several observable 
characteristics which are better than men ´s (e.g., educational attainment). Yet, our main 
result is that the gender gap in PP is much higher, both in raw terms and adjusted for 
observable characteristics, than the gap in non-PP compensation, and that there are 
clear signs of a “glass ceiling” effect (higher gaps and lower female participation of 
women in the upper parts of the PP distribution). Our explanation for these findings 
relies mostly on the existence of monopsonistic features in the PP segment of the labour 
market, possibly related to women´s lower mobility due to their attachment to 
household tasks, and to a lesser extent on theories explaining women ´s segregation in 
different occupations than men. Nonetheless, this interpretation has to be taken with a 
caution since our dataset lacks information on workers´ civil status and household 
composition which can only be (rather imperfectly) proxied by workers´ age groups.   
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APPENDIX 1: Contribution of PP gender gap to the total gender gap  
 
The total hourly wage (w ) is defined as the sum of the non-PP/fixed component ( f ) 
and the PP/variable component ( v ). Since )ln()ln()ln( vfvf +≠+ , it is difficult to 
compute the gender gap in log points (as is customary in the literature) by means of the 
difference between the averages of logged wages for males (M) as females (F) i.e., as 
Mwln - Fwln , and then proceed to decompose the overall gap into the respective gaps of 
the fixed and variable components.  
 However, such decomposition is straightforward if we express the gaps in percent 
rather than in logged points. In effect, given that:  
                                                                      vfw +=  
then taking sample averages for each gender yields: 
                                                                   MMM vfw +=                                                     (A.1.1) 
                                                                   FFF vfw +=                                                       (A.1.2) 
Therefore, the following decomposition of the total gender gap (in percent) in terms of 
the two gender gaps in the components (also in percent) holds exactly for the restricted 
sample of workers receiving PP:  
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 where 
F
F
w
f=α , while, for the whole sample of PP and non-PP workers, we have: 
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such that  
ALL
PP
N
N=ϕ , where PPN  and ALLN  are the respective number of observations in 
the restricted and whole samples. Hence, the second terms in the RHS of (A.1.3) and 
(A.1.4) are interpreted as the contributions of the gender gap in the PP component to the 
overall gender gap in the two samples. 
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APPENDIX 2: An illustrative model of the gender implications of PP  
 
(A) Competitive wages 
Let us assume that a PP worker of (exogenous) skill δ receives a wage 
W per unit of output produced and that firms incur a fixed C of monitoring the 
worker which in a competitive market is paid by the worker. Denoting effort by 
e , output is assumed to be )( e+δ . Effort produces a disutility cost )(ec which is 
increasing and convex. We assume the functional form )1/()( 1 γγ += +eec with 
0>γ . Given women ´s higher involvement in housework, their disutility of 
effort is higher than for men, namely, )1/(1 γφ γ ++e ,  where φ >1. Therefore, we 
can write down the utility of men (M) and women (F) in PP jobs as follows:  
)1/()( 1 γδ γ +−−+= +eCeWU PPM                                                                  (A.2.1) 
)1/()( 1 γφδ γ +−−+= +eCeWU PPF                                                               (A.2.2) 
Regarding non PP jobs, let us assume that the worker produces a 
minimum level of output, say δ , which can be monitored by the firm at no cost 
and does not involve any effort. After all, it is painful to produce output and, in 
the absence of monitoring, the worker can get away without producing any 
more than δ  . This implies that the utility for both men and women of this type 
of job is simply given by: 
                            δWU NPP =                                                                       (A.2.3)  
Workers´ effort decision in PP jobs is simply obtained by equating the 
marginal revenue from exerting effort to its marginal cost. From (A.2.1) and 
(A.2.2), it yields γMeW = and γφ FF eW = , whereby γγγ φ FFM eee >= . Substituting these 
two expression into (A.2.1) and (A.2.2), implies that worker  FMi ,(= ) will 
choose PP for ,*iδδ >   where  
    NPPFMFMMMM
PP
M UWCeeeeU ==−++=++=
++ δϕδγ
γφδγ
γδ γγγγ *1*1*
11
)(         (A.2.4) 
    NPPFFFF
PP
F UWCeeU ==−++=
+ δδγ
γφδ γγ *1*
1
)(                                            (A.2.5) 
Comparing both expressions, we get that MMF δφδδ >= . Thus, assuming 
that the skills distribution is identical across genders, we should expect fewer 
women in PP jobs and, conditionally on receiving PP, higher ability among 
female workers than among male workers.  
Further, if women are aware of discrimination in non- PP jobs where, say, 
they get paid δαWU NPPF = , with 10 <<α  , whereas δWU NPPM = , then obviously 
they will have higher preference for  PP jobs than before.  Moreover, in this case 
they will even be more prominent in PP jobs than men if 1=φ . 
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(B)  Predetermined wages and job attachment uncertainty 
A slightly different model where wages are no longer given but set by 
employers in order to avoid career interruption can be written using a slight 
adaptation of Lazear and Rosen ´s (1992) model of assignment of workers to 
slow and fast- jobs.  Let us assume that individuals in PP jobs work for two 
periods and are endowed with the same ability δ  which is known to the firm. 
In the initial period, they produce δ  and receive a wage W1.  As a result of 
longer tenure, their productivity in period 2 raises toµδ , where 1>µ  and get 
paid W2. It is assumed that, workers receive a disutility shock, ω, in both periods 
which may force them to quit the job (say, for family duties). The ω shock is an 
i.i.d.  random variable, independent across periods, with c.d.f. F(ω) which is 
revealed to the worker after the wage in either period has been set by the firm.  
Thus, wages are predetermined and workers will stay in the firm both periods 
as long as Wti - ω ≥ 0, t=1, 2 and i=F, M . 
The key difference between men and women is that the c.d.f. for men, 
FM(ω), is stochastically dominated by the c.d.f. for women FF(ω), namely FM(ω) 
> FF(ω) for ω > 0. This assumption captures the fact that women are more likely 
to be affected by the shock than men. To simplify matters, and without loss of 
generality in terms of the qualitative results, we will assume that dF(.) are 
uniform distributions, such that the density functions verify:  fM(ω) = U[0, εM] 
and fF(ω) = U[0, εF ], with εF > εM. 
To solve for both wages, we proceed backwards in time. Under the 
assumption that the wage in period 2, W2i (i=f, m), is offered before ω is 
realized, employers will choose W2i in order to maximize expected profits in 
period 2, subject to the participation constraint in this period and conditional on 
the probability of staying in the firm during period 1 (equal to iiW ε/1  under a 
uniform distribution), namely:   
 ( ) FMiWWWdWW ii
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=−=−∫ µδεωµδε              (A.2.6) 
whereby the first-order condition (f.o.c.) w.r.t. W2i implies that the wage paid in  
equilibrium to male and female workers is identical:12  
                                             W2* = 2/µδ                                                             (A.2.7) 
 and by replacing W2* into the bracketed term in (A.2.6) , the firm ´s profit in 
period 2 (Π*2i) is given by Π*2i = 2221 4/)( iiW εµδ .  
     Going back to period 1, firms will choose W1i to maximize the sum of 
expected profits in both periods, subject to the participation constraint in that 
period, i.e. 
                                                 
12 This is just the average of the worker´ s productivity´ and the outside wage which is assumed 
to be zero.  The weight ½ in the average is due to the choice of the uniform distribution in the 
illustration. Alternative distributions will give rise to a weighted average with unequal weights.   
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which implies that: 
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 Since MF εε > , it follows that *1*1 FM WW > . Given that, for the same δ , *2*2 FM WW = , 
it follows that the return to tenure ( )*1
*
2 ii WW − is higher for women than for men.   
 Non-PP jobs can be interpreted in terms of this model as implying that ,1=µ  
that is, a flatter wage profile. From (A.2.7) and (A.2.8) with 1=µ , we get that 
wages in non-PP jobs are lower than in PP jobs. 
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Figure 1.  Gender wage gaps (Total, Non-PP and PP components) 
- Whole Sample (in percent)-  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Gender wage gaps and the contribution of PP component 
- Sample of PP workers (in percent)- 
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Table 1 – Sample characteristics (Full-time workers between 18-65 years)  
Variables Women (65,233)  Men (129,930)    
     Mean Mean 
   
Individual Characteristics 
Education 
    
  
 
Primary or less 0.176 0.275    
Secondary 0.508 0.545    
University 0.316 0.180    
Age        
Less 30 years 0.257 0.200    
31-40 0.354 0.323    
41-50 0.245 0.265    
>50 0.143 0.212    
Tenure (years) 7.410 8.867    
Permanent Contract 0.727 0.768    
Wages        
Total Hourly Wage (logs) 2.185 2.391    
Performance Pay        
% PP job 0.227 0.227    
Total Hourly PP (only PP workers) 1.127 1.958    
Firm Characteristics        
Size        
<50 workers 0.339 0.403    
51-200 workers 0.265 0.288    
>200 workers 0.396 0.309    
Firm Bargaining Agreement. 0.163 0.194    
Exporting firms 0.163 0.194    
 Source: EES (2006)        
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Table 2a: Characteristics of workers and firms by type of job and gender   
  
Worker with PP   
 
Workers w/o PP  
 
Women  Men  Women  Men      
(14789 obs.) (29460 obs.) (50444 obs.) (100470 obs.)   
            
Variables Mean Mean Mean Mean   
Education           
Primary or less 0.107 0.178 0.196 0.304   
Secondary 0.494 0.545 0.512 0.545   
University 0.399 0.277 0.292 0.151   
Age           
Less 30 years 0.204 0.149 0.273 0.215   
31-40 0.381 0.313 0.346 0.325   
41-50 0.265 0.294 0.239 0.257   
>50 0.150 0.244 0.141 0.203   
Tenure (years) 9.281 12.037 6.861 7.938   
Indefinite Contract 0.814 0.862 0.741 0.741   
Firm Characteristics         
Size           
<50 workers 0.201 0.235 0.380 0.452   
51-200 workers 0.239 0.297 0.272 0.285   
>200 workers 0.560 0.467 0.348 0.262   
 
Collective Bargaining(ref: Industry level)  
 
 
Firm Bargaining Agr. 0.193 0.288 0.154 0.167   
Firm Market (ref: non-exp .firms)       
 
Exporting firms  
 
0.231 
 
0.261 
 
0.135 
 
0.153  
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  Table 2b: Incidence of PP by industry and occupation 
  
  Mean Std. Dev. No. Obs.   
  Industries   
  Mine & Extractive Ind. 0.188 0.391 2919   
  Manufactures 0.205 0.404 74332   
  Energy 0.324 0.468 4627   
  Construction 0.127 0.333 17096   
  Retail trade 0.241 0.427 17131   
  Hotels and Restaurants 0.123 0.328 8315   
  Transportation 0.324 0.468 12710   
  Financial Intermediation 0.598 0.490 10475   
  Real State and Res. Serv. 0.194 0.395 16342   
  Education 0.092 0.289 7998   
  Health 0.287 0.452 14178   
  Other Services 0.146 0.353 9040   
  Occupations   
  Managers 0.497 0.500 6190   
  Professionals 0.288 0.453 20295   
  Technicians 0.326 0.469 30184   
  Clerks 0.257 0.437 24761   
  Personal Services 0.196 0.397 17528   
  Agriculture and Fisheries 0.146 0.353 542   
  Craftsmen 0.169 0.375 37918   
  Operators and Assemblers 0.180 0.384 34822   
  
Laborers, non-qualified 
operators 0.127 0.333 22923   
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                 Table 2c:  Share of women throughout  the PP distribution 
 
    % Women in percentile   
[p0-p10]  40.6%   
[p11-pw25]  40.3%   
[p26-pw50]  39.5%   
[p51-pw75]  32.0%   
[p76-pw90]  24.8%   
[p91-pw95]  18.6%   
[p95-pw100]  15.9%   
       
 
 
 
      
 
Table 3a:  Hourly wages for PP and non-PP Workers    
   PP   Non-PP  
  
   Women  Men  Women  Men 
  
Ratio  Ratio       Total 
Hourly 
Wage(€) 
PP/Total  
Wage (%)
Total 
Hourly 
Wage(€) 
PP/Total  
Wage(%) 
Total 
Hourly 
Wage(€) 
Total 
Hourly 
Wage(€)    
        
        
Average  14.503  7.164  19.144  9.012  9.678  11.665    
P10th  6.060  0.976  7.801  0.009  3.721  4.689    
P25th  8.577  2.087  10.804  0.025  5.884  7.308    
P50th  12.479  4.657  16.051  0.060  8.126  9.826    
P75th  18.800  9.491  23.546  0.127  12.048  14.192    
P90th   24.842    16.684     33.127      0.217     17.795     20.162    
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             Table 3b:  Hourly wage components for workers with PP (in €)  
 
             
     Women   Men
    PP wage 
Other wage 
components   
PP 
wage 
Other wage 
components     
                
Average 1.127 13.376   1.958 17.186    
P10th 0.102 5.648   0.132 7.031    
P25th 0.225 7.850   0.324 9.675    
P50th 0.539 11.679   0.890 14.758    
P75th 1.311 17.509   2.198 21.694    
P90th 2.594 22.828   4.493 29.597    
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Table 4: Log hourly wage regressions   
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Total Wage 
(1) (2) (3)   
PP Workers  Non-PP Workers Pooled 
    0.208*** PP Job 
    (0.009) 
-0.223*** -0.212*** -0.219*** Female 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
0.139*** 0.098*** 0.095*** Age 30-39 (ref:<30) 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
0.199*** 0.116*** 0.114*** Age 41-49 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.227*** 0.161*** 0.161*** Age 50-59 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) 
0.262*** 0.155*** 0.158*** Age >60 
(0.014) (0.007) (0.008) 
0.277*** 0.223*** 0.215*** College (ref: Primary) 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
0.077*** 0.063*** 0.060*** Secondary 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
0.044*** 0.042*** 0.043*** Tenure 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** Tenure sq. 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.282*** 0.313*** 0.312*** Permanent Contract 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm Size:  50-199  0.067*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 
Ref: <50)  (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
0.118*** 0.166*** 0.164*** Firm Size: >199 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
0.011 0.015* 0.013* Firm  Agreement 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
0.027*** 0.035*** 0.045*** Export market 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Interactions with PP           
     -0.007 Female*PP 
     (0.005) 
     -0.047*** Age 30-39*PP 
(ref:<30)       (0.007) 
     -0.029*** Age 41-49*PP 
     (0.008) 
     0.072*** Age 50-59*PP 
     (0.010) 
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     0.101*** Age >60*PP 
     (0.016) 
     0.089*** College*PP (ref: 
Primary)       (0.007) 
     0.030*** Secondary*PP 
            (0.006)       
    
 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.025*** 
 
Tenure*PP                    
 
Permanent 
Contract*PP       (0.007) 
Firm Size:  (ref<50) 
50-199*PP       -0.027*** 
       (0.006) 
     -0.042*** Firm Size: >199*PP 
     (0.006) 
     -0.006** Firm  Agreement*PP 
     (0.003) 
Export. Firm *PP       -0.014*** 
        (0.006) 
 
No. Observations  44249 150914 195163 
R sq. 0.605 0.511 0.573 
Note: S.e´s. in parentheses.  Estimations also control for industry dummies (11), 
occupational dummies (8) and regional dummies (17).  
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Table 5: Probit estimation 
Dependent Variable: Receiving Performance Pay (1/0) 
        
(1) (2)   
        
-0.047*** -0.103***   Female 
(0.008) (0.016)   
0.052*** 0.016**   Age 30-39 (ref:<30) 
(0.010) (0.008)   
0.032*** 0.002   Age 41-49 
(0.011) (0.013)   
0.015 -0.010   Age 50-59 
(0.013) (0.015)   
-0.076*** -0.099***   Age >60 
(0.023) (0.026)   
0.260*** 0.262***   University (ref: Primary) 
(0.013) (0.013)   
0.164*** 0.161***   Secondary 
(0.009) (0.009)   
0.030*** 0.031***   Tenure 
(0.001) (0.001)   
-0.001*** -0.001***   Tenure square 
(0.000) (0.000)   
0.037*** 0.035***   Permanent Contract 
(0.010) (0.010)   
Firm Size:  50-199 0.295*** 0.301***   
Ref: <50) (0.009) (0.009)   
0.485*** 0.478***   Firm Size: >199 
(0.008) (0.009)   
0.096** 0.120***   Firm Collective Agreement 
(0.009) (0.009)   
0.122*** 0.120***   Exporting firm 
(0.009) (0.011)   
Interactions with female 
        
  -0.047***   Age 30-39*Female (ref:<30) 
  (0.019)   
  -0.031***   Age 41-49*Female 
  (0.011)   
  0.072***   Age 50-59*Female 
  (0.024)   
  0.062   Age >60*Female 
  (0.052)   
No. Observations 195163 195163   
Pseudo R2 0.111 0.123   
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)      
OLS Heckman selection 
Within 
Firm 
Within 
Occupations  
Within 
Firm-
Occupation     
-0.407*** -0.453*** -0.343*** -0.434*** -0.290***     Female (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011)     
0.257*** 0.337*** 0.181*** 0.281*** 0.143***     Age 30-39 (ref:<30) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.017)     
0.334*** 0.381*** 0.252*** 0.313*** 0.192***     Age 41-49 (0.022) (0.026) (0.019) (0.027) (0.019)     
0.326*** 0.353*** 0.238*** 0.298*** 0.184***     Age 50-59 (0.026) (0.031) (0.022) (0.031) (0.021)     
0.601*** 0.532*** 0.416*** 0.395*** 0.311***     Age >60 (0.044) (0.052) (0.037) (0.053) (0.036)     
0.793*** 0.350*** 0.362*** 0.636*** 0.280***     College (ref: Primary) (0.020) (0.064) (0.128) (0.053) (0.062)     
0.109*** 0.380*** 0.010** 0.213*** 0.043     Secondary (0.018) (0.035) (0.064) (0.029) (0.035)     
 
0.023*** 
 
0.061*** 
 
0.019*** 
 
0.060*** 
 
0.0173*** 
    Tenure 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)     
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000***     Tenure square (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
0.450*** 0.534*** 0.389*** 0.443*** 0.362***     Permanent Contract (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021)     
Firm Size:  50-199 -0.126*** 0.236***   0.317***       
Ref: <50) (0.018) (0.045)   (0.048)       
-0.209*** 0.366***   0.505***       Firm Size: >199 (0.017) (0.068)   (0.0726)       
 
-0.019         
    Firm  Agreement 
(0.016)             
Exporting firm 0.114*** 0.262***   0.263***       
  (0.016) (0.024)   (0.023)       
Inv. Mills Ratio   1.628*** 1.693*** 1.984*** 1.513 ***     
    (0.170) (0.198) (0.141) 0.474)      
No. Obs. 44249 195163 44249 44249 44249     
R sq. 0.186 0.175 0.115 0.089 0.125   
                
Table 6: Estimates of alternative specifications of log hourly wage equation 
corrected for selectivity 
Dependent Variable: log PP wage component 
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Table 7:  Adjusted gender wage gaps – Quantile regressions  
(with selection correction)   
Dependent Variable: Log PP Hourly Wage   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   
 P10th P25th P50th P75th P90th   
  
              
 
-0.202** 
(0.022) 
-0.272*** 
(0.020) 
-0.301*** 
(0.014) 
-0.354*** 
(0.016) 
-0.433*** 
(0.019)   
Female (WFO) 
        
Note: s.e´s. in parentheses.  Estimations also control for the whole set of covariates (age, education, 
tenure, type of contract) as well as regional dummies and firm & occupational fixed effects (WFO).  
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Table 8: Decomposition of (log) hourly gap in PP 
Unadjusted Gender Wage Gap in PP: 46 log-points 
Variables 
Absolute [relative]  
Contribution of Diff.  
in Characteristics 
(Xm-Xf)*βm 
Absolute [relative] 
Contribution of Diff. 
in Returns 
(βm-βf)*Xf 
Sample Selection 0.62 
[1.34%] 
-1.56 
[-3.39%] 
Tenure 3.44 
[7.47%] 
-1.93 
[-4.19%] 
Education -2.82 
[-6.13%] 
3.83 
[8.33%] 
Age 1.35 
[2.93%] 
8.46 
[18.39%] 
Type of Contract 1.02 
[2.22%] 
2.42 
[5.26%] 
Occup. and Firm 
Effects  
1.81 
[3.93%] 
3.36 
[7.30%] 
Constant  26.0 
[56.52%] 
Total 5.42 
[11.8%] 
 
40.58 
[88.2%] 
 Note: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition based on WFO estimation for men and women allowing for 
different returns by gender.  
 
 
        
 
